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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the Court below, respondent Bryan L. Slade sought
judgment finding him to have legitimated Corey Leon Slade and
awarding him visitation rights.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the Court below, Judge Dean E. Conder, by temporary
order, awarded respondent visitation rights on alternate weekends.

Upon conclusion of trial, after having taken the matter

under advisement, Judge David K. Winder found respondent to
have legitimated this child; found that respondent was entitled
to have visitation with this child once a month only, from
10:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. on the third Saturday of each month;
and ordered respondent to pay child support in the amount of
$150.00 a month, although appellant had not counter-claimed
or otherwise prayed for child support.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals from the decision of the Court below,
seeking reversal in toto, or in the alternative, reversal
limited to that part of the Decree which awarded to respondent
rights of visitation.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1973, dppellant conceived Corey Leon Slade, her son.
She asked respondent, father of her child, to marry her so
she could give this child a home.
to get an abortion.

th~

His response was to tell

~r

Appellant refused as this was morally re-

pugnant to her.

Later he asked her to have the child adopted

at his expense.

She refused as her maternal feeling for the

unborn child was so strong that the prospect of giving up her
child was unacceptable to her.

(Trans. A, p. 57, 1. 19-p. 58,

p. 10)

On March 30, 1974, Corey was born out of wedlock.

His

father had not prepared a home for him, choosing instead to
reside alone in the house he was purchasing while Corey lived
with appellant in proverty-level lodging.

(Trans. A, p. 58,

1. 15, et seq.)

After Corey was born, respondent paid the medical expense;
of his birth, as requested by appellant's mother.
p. 18, 1. 5)

(Trans. B,

Before Corey's birth, respondent signed, upon

request of appellant, a Declaration of Paternity, statins his
willingness to support the child.

(Trans. A, p. 3, 1. 29-

p. 4, 1. 6)

Respondent did not support Corey.

Not until so ordered

by Judge David K. Winder on September 23, 1977 (R.96), three
years and four months later, did he make meaningful contributior
to the child's support.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondent visited sporadically with Corey during his
infancy.

(Trans. A, p. 59, 11. 25-29)

He gave Corey toys.

He introduced Corey to members of his family, but at no time
did Corey even remain overnight with respondent.
stayed or resided with respondent in his home.

Corey never
No de facto

family relationship of mother, father, and child was ever
established.

And respondent has never represented appellant

to be his wife.
Respondent has not participated in the child's religious
or secular education.

He has assumed no responsibility for

his physical, mental, and spiritual development and well being.
The evidence shows only that he has enjoyed his playmate status
with Corey.
On May 15, 1976, appellant married Carmen Richard Dennis,
who had, over a period of many months before this marriage,
developed a strong, warm relationship with Corey.

It was --

and it remains -- Mr. Dennis's intent to adopt Corey.

Perhaps

aware of this intent, on or about July 13, 1976, respondent
filed his complaint and had issued his Order to Show Cause in
this action in the Third District Court, State of Utah.

Also,

upon advice of counsel, respondent filed an Acknowledgement of
Paternity at this time.

(Trans. A, p. 3, 1. 29-p. 4, 1. 6)

On July 21, 1976, Judge Dean E. Conder issued an order
granting respondent visitation on alternate weekends, requiring respondent's counsel to file a memorandum of points and
authorities, and requiring the parties to engage a psychiatrist
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or other competent professional to evaluate the effect on the
child of visitation with respondent.

(R.

Upon respondent's

1
•

recommendation, Dr. Delbert T. Goates, M.D., was engaged to
interview Corey,

ap~ellant,

her husband, and respondent, and

to submit his findings and recommendations to the Court.

Dr.

Goates' report, recommending termination of the relationship
of Corey and respondent, was filed with the Court on December

1, 1976.

(R. 119-134.)

On April 15, 1977, and May 26, 1977, trial was had in thi:I
matter before Judge David K. Winder without a jury.
At trial, appellant testified that visitation with respondent had been harmful to Corey and that it is not in his
best interests.

Her testimony, corroborated by other witnesses.

was not rebutted by respondent.

Testimony of expert witnesses,:

Dr. Goates and Virginia Husband, M. S. W., established that visi·i
tation with respondent is not in the best interests of the chilcj
i

(Trans. B, pp. 27-28, 32-34, 37-44, 45-48)
Nevertheless, by Memorandum Decision, dated August 1,

1977, Judge David K. Winder, ruling that Corey had been legit~
mated pursuant to §78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, found
for respondent, although decreasing his visitation to only s~
(6) hours a month and ordering him to pay, although appellant
had not so prayed, child support in the amount of $150.00 per
month .

( R. 9 1 . )

-4-
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Subsequently, following denial of various motions for
reconsideration submitted by the parties, appellant, on or about
February 27, 1978, filed her Notice of Appeal.

POINT I.
THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS SHOULD
BE THE PRIMARY CONCERN IN DETERMINING
QUESTIONS OF VISITATION PRIVILEGES.
It has been uniformly recognized, in determining awards
of visitation to fathers of children born out of wedlock, that
the best interests of the child rather than the rights or alleged
rights of the parent, or parents, are of paramount importance.
See,~·~··

Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 417, 421-28; J. Harkins,

''Putative Father's Visitation Rights," 19 CLEV.ST.L.REV. 549
(1970).

See also, generally, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit,

Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973).
For example, the Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v.
Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965), stated:
[E]very case must be decided on the basis of its
own particular facts.
The unique problems of each
child must receive individual attention and consideration. Any attempt by us to determine the best interest
of every child by a single rule would be judicially,
socially, and morally unsound.
Id., at 158.
Appellant calls the attention of the Court to yet another
authority supporting this principle.

In Sullivan v. Bonafonte,

376 A.2d 69 (1977), the Connecticut Supreme Court applied this
principle, that the paramount consideration is the child's best
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-5Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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interest, to a case involving a putative father's visitation
privileges.

The Court noted that the father -- who initially

refused to marry the child's mother when she was pregnant, who 1
urged her to have an abortion, who voluntarily helped pay some
of the medical expenses associated with the child's birth, and
1

who sent child support money and Christmas gifts -- had visitec
the child only infrequently when he was between three and six
months old.

Further, the father did not introduce evidence

showing that

the child

needed to be

given

the chance

to

develop a relationship with him or that visitation would have
a "positive effect" on the child.

1

The Connecticut Supreme Cour:'

affirmed the lower Court's determination that visitation would I
not be in the child's best interests.
In the words of the Court, the "friction which would be !
engendered by court-ordered visitation was not offset by any
prospective benefit to the child, nor was the child threatened'
by the termination of an important existing relationship."
Id., at 71.
The parallels between Sullivan and the instant case are
strikingly obvious.

Expert testimony introduced at trial al~

found no positive benefit to Corey accruing from visitation by.
I

the plaintiff.

(Trans. B, pp. 27-28, 32-34, 37-44, 45-48~

~-

spondent has not and cannot deny that Corey's best interests
are paramount.

Further, he has not challenged or contested

appellant's argument that her family's right of privacy should
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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be weighed in considering Corey's best interests and that this
child would directly benefit from the protection of that family
privacy.

See Point IX, infra.

POINT II.
RESPONDENT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED
THAT VISITATION WITH RESPONDENT
IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD
Respondent acknowledged at trial, in preliminary comment,
his burden of proving that Corey's best interests should be paramount in determination of the visitation issued.

(Trans. A,

p. 6, 11. 9-14)

Respondent did not meet this burden of proof.
Respondent did not rebut or challenge Dr. Goates' findings that respondent is "primarily immature," that he "has
difficulty making decisions on an altruistic basis," and that
he makes decisions "on an infantile basis of seeking his own
gratification."

Respondent did not rebut or challenge Dr.

Goates' recommendations.
For the welfare of the child, it would be optimal if
he were provided the opportunity to have a divorce, as
did his mother, from Mr. Slade. However, there is no
divorce involved inasmuch as his mother was never married.
Indeed, she could have had him aborted, and there would
be no further litigation. It was her decision not to
have an abortion; she kept him, and it would be her preference that he be adopted by her husband. For the
welfare of Corey, who primarily knows no other father
than Mr. Dennis except as a gentleman who, for his own
needs, periodically comes to visit him, it would be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-7Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

preferable if a complete separation between the biological father and the child would occur just as if he hadbeen adopted out rather than aborted and that he now be
allowed to be adopted by his mother's husband -- indeed
this represents an optimal circumstance, inasmuch as he
could well be reared by his natural mother and her present consort. (Report, R. 133) [Emphasis added]
Mrs. Virginia Husband, certified clinical social worker,
expert witness for the appellant, testified that all of Corey's
needs for a father were being met by appellant's husband and
that Corey was in no need for additional fathering by the
dent.

(Trans. B, p. 27, 1. 27, p. 28, 1. 23)

res~

Finding that furthE:

visitation by the respondent with Corey would result in difficulty, confusion and conflict, Mrs. Husband summarized respondent's conduct as "a dastardly thing to do to a child." (Trans.
B, p. 32, 11. 20-25)

She further testified that such visitrtk

would place Corey's self-esteem and self-confidence in jeopardy.
(Trans. B, p 33, 11. 1-9)
Testimony of the appellant and her witnesses further cor·
roborated the expert testimony of Dr. Goates and Mrs. Husband.
Appellant testified that on April 23, 1977, Corey returned frorr
a visit with respondent with motorcycle burns on his leg and th'
on other occasions he had returned from such visits with soiled
pants.

(Trans. B, p. 4, 1. 19-p. 5, 1. 2)

Testimony of Julia

Sanchez established that the respondent volunteered no explana·,
tion of these burns.

(Trans. B, p. 20, 11. 17-24).

In addil~

Carmen R. Dennis testified that the child has returned from
visits with the respondent tired and in ill humor.

(Trans. B,

11.Law8,
9) Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by thep.
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No testimony was elicited from any witness that the respondent has in any way contributed to the moral, intellectual,
or physical development of Corey or that respondent has the
capacity, skills, or inclination to do so in the future.

POINT III.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING
FOR THE RESPONDENT ABSENT EVIDENCE
THAT VISITATION IS IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Judge David K. Winder's Memorandum Decision, dated August
1, 1977, makes no mention of Corey's best interests, and this
issue is not touched upon in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, filed September 23, 1977 (R. 93).

Appellant's motion to

amend these documents to, inter alia, incorporate this issue
was denied.
(R. 107).

See Memorandum Decision, dated January 24, 1978
The decision to award judgment in favor of the respon-

dent, however reluctant, appears to be grounded entirely on
Judge Winder's conclusion that respondent had legitimated the
child pursuant to §78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

As the

preponderance of the evidence established that visitation with
the respondent was detrimental to Corey's best interest, the
Court below was in error.

POINT IV.
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO
RIGHTS EQUAL TO THOSE OF A
DIVORCED FATHER

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Some months after judgment in this matter, the United
States Supreme Court considered the question of whether or not
principles of equal protection require the same standard to bE
applied to married and unmarried fathers.

The Court found no

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in a Georgia statutory scheme which, as applied, gav;
fit fathers of legitimate children the authority to veto

ado~

tion while denying this right to fathers of illegitimate children.

Quilloin v. Walcott, 54 L·Ed.2d 511 (1978)
In affirming the decision of the Georgia tribunal, the

Court also considered the countervailing parental interests
posited by the biological father's assertions of legitimation
and his alleged rights of visitation and the appellee's

all~~

tions of disruption of the de

~family

best interests of the child.

Thus, the Court addressed the

unit,counter to the
q~

tion left unresolved in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
.the degree of protection a State must afford to
the rights of an unwed father in a situation, such as
that presented here, in which the countervailing interests are more substantial. Quilloin, at 511.
The trial court had found that the appellant father had ·
provided support only on an irregular basis, that he had visite
with his child on "many occasions," that he had given the chili
toys and other gifts, and that his contacts with the child w~
having a disruptive effect on the child and on the appellee'sr
tire family.

On the basis of these findings and others pertain•'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to appellee's marriage and the mother's uninterrupted custody,
the Court determined adoption to be in the best interest of the
child and found legitimation and visitation rights to be counter
to the best interests of the child.

Id., at 517.

Claiming violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, appellant took an appeal to
the Georgia Supreme Court.
Court relied

In affirming for the appellee, this

generally on the strong state policy of rearing

children in a family setting, emphasized that the adoption was
being sought by the child's stepfather who was part of the family
unit, and noted in addition that the appellant biological father
had never been a de facto member of the child's family unit.
In affirming the decision of the Georgia Court, the United
States Supreme Court found no violation of the rights secured to
the biological father under the Fourteenth Amendment, finding his
interests readily distinguishable from those of divorced fathers.
In so concluding, the Court observed that although the
biological father had been subject to support obligations, unlike
a divorced father, he had never exercised actual or legal custody
over the child, and had thus never assumed any significant responsibility for his daily supervision, education, protection,
or care.

Id., at 520.

In the case now under consideration, this equal protection
issue was initially raised at trial by respondent.
-11-

For example,
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see the cross-examination of Mrs. Husband in which respondent
attempts to establish that al though visitation may cause diffi
culties, these must be endured equally whether or not the chli
was born in wedlock.

(Trans. B, p 41, 1. 14, et seq.)

Judge

Winder, toward conclusion of trial, also suggested that, in h:
opinion, divorced fathers and fathers of children born out of
wedlock must, as a matter of law, be treated equally.
It isn't necessarily what I would like to do any more
than I like to have visitation by the father after
the divorce.
I think it is disruptive and I think
it is going to be very disruptive to have Mr. Slade
-- somewhat disruptive to have him visit with the
child. But I think that it is inherent in any
divorce situation.
(Trans. B, p. 66, 1. 26-p. 67, 1. 1
The relationships of the biological fathers and

their~

of-wedlock children in Quill ion, supra, and the instant case;:
so nearly identical that, it is respectfully submitted, had
Quillion been decided before September 23, 1977, Judge Winder
may well have decided in favor of the appellant, denying visit
tion to the respondent.

The following passage would have been

considered with care.
Appellant contends that even if he is not entitled to
prevail as a matter of due process, principles of equ~
protection require that his authority to veto an adop·
tion be measured by the same standard that would have
been applied to a married father.
In particular, appe'.
lant asserts that his interests are indistinguishable
from those of a married father who is separated or
divorced from the mother and is no longer living with
his child, and therefore the State acted impermissibly
in treating his case differently. We think appellan~
interests are readily distinguishable from those of_3.
divorced father, and accordingly believe that the StaU
could permissively give appellant less veto authority
than it provides to a married father.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may -12contain errors.

Although appellant was subject, for the years prior
to these proceedings, to essentially the same child
support obligation as a married father would have had,
. . . he has never exercised actual or legal custody
over his child, and thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child.
Appellant does not complain of his exemption from these
responsibilities and, indeed, he does not even now seek
custody of his child.
In contrast, legal custody of
children is of course a central aspect of the marital
relationship, and even a father whose marriage has
broken apart will have borne full responsibility for
the rearing of his children during the period of the
marriage.
Under any standard of review, the State was
not foreclosed from recognizing this difference in the
extent of commitment to the welfare of the child.
Id.,at 520. [Emphasis added]
Application of Quilloin to the issues presented by the
case now before this Court, in a manner favorable to appellant,
would not be violative of respondent's rights to due process, as
Quilloin does not negate rights previously conferred upon respondent and persons similarly situated.

Respondent's arguments to

the Court below, citing Stanley v. Illinois, supra, as supportive
of his alleged rights of visitation are in error.

See Point VII,

infra.

POINT

V.

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING
RESPONDENT TO HAVE LEGITIMATED THE
CHILD BY ACKNOWLEDGMENT, PURSUANT
TO §78-30-12, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953.
A. General.
In his Memorandum Decision of August 1, 1977, Judge
Winder found the respondent to have legitimated Corey by acknowlSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
edgment pursuant to §78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, for
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the reasons that respondent was deemed to have received the
child as his own, to have received him into his family, and to
have treated him as a legitimate child.

In so finding, the

Court below was in error.
Section 78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as
follows:
The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly
acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such
with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into
his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were
a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and
such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth. The foregoing provisions of this chapter do not apply to such an adoption.
This statute, adopted by the Utah legislature in 1911,.
a literal copy of §230 of the California Civil Code, first en·
acted in 1870.
The purpose of the California legitimation statute, and
by direct inference that of the Utah statute, is to effect a
change in the procedures of "legitimation."

The statute is

designed to expedite the assimilation of the previously illegit
mate child into the home and family of its father without the
publicity of a judicial proceeding.
98 (1938) .

Note, 12

so.

CAL. L. REV. 97,

It is submitted that the primary purpose of the

statute is to confer a benefit upon the out-of-wedlock child,
not to bestow a benefit upon his father, especially when to do
the latter would be detrimental to the best interests of the ~

-14-
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While this Court has not previously had an opportunity
to apply the statute to the questions in issue, courts in California and in other states have construed like statutes in their
own decisions.

See, Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 705, 741-50.

B. Because Corey has not been received into respondent's
family, the Court below erred in finding respondent to have
legitimated the child.
Legitimation of an illegitimate child under the California
species of legitimation statute has been held to require proof
that the biological father received the child into his family,
with the consent of his wife, if he is married. In re Peterson's
Estate, 214 Cal.App.2d 258, 29 Cal.Rptr. 384 (Cir.Ct. 1963);
H. CLARK. LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 160 (1968) . Reception into
the father's family implies some residence of the child with
the father.

See,~-~··

Re Kessler's Estate, 74 N.W.2d 599 (S.D.

1956); Clark, supra, at 160-61; Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 705, 784
(1954).
The statute clearly indicates that the relationship contemplated is the equivalent of the adoption of a non-related
child.

Actual residence in the home and family of the biologi-

cal father is required.

In re Reyna, 55 Cal.App.3d 288, 298,

126 Cal.Rptr. 138, 145 (Ct. App. Cal. 1976).

Darwin v. Granger,

174 cal.App.2d 63, 72, 344 P.2d 353, 358, would require that the
biological father live with the mother and child "for a short
period during which he represented the mother as his wife and the
child as his own."

The main theme is the establishment of a
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normalized family relationship for at least some period of

t~

The California Courts of Appeal have required that the
child be physically received into the father's home, or
place of habitation," for a period of time.

"sett~
~

In re Reyna, 55

App.3d 288, 298, 126 Cal.Rptr. 138, 145 {Ct.App.Cal. 1976); In
Richard M., 14 Cal. 3d 783, 794, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531, 537, 537
363, 371,

P.:

{Cal. S.Ct. 1975); Guardianship of Truschke, 237 Cal.

App.2d 75, 76-77, 46 Cal.Rptr. 601, 603, 604 (Cal.App. 1965).
The courts have emphasized the propriety

and

necessi~

of a de facto family relationship as between the mother, the
natural father and the child.

In Truschke, supra, the lower

court's determination denying the natural father's petition fc:
appointment as guardian of his illegitimate child was upheldo:
appeal, on the ground that he had not legitimated the
accord with §230.

child~

The facts closely resemble those of the cas!

now under consideration, except for the fact that the fatheri:
Truschke, unlike respondent, offered to marry his child's rnoth1
In Truschke, the appellant contended that because he had offer<
to marry the child's mother and had expended approximately $31'
for a crib, baby clothes, and other necessities for the child':
we fare before her birth, it should not be required that he tak;
his child physically into his family circle
terms of §230.

to comply with th'

In pertinent part, the court rejected appellan:

reasoning as follows:
We cannot accept appellant's argument that because of
his willingness and desire to receive his child into
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

his home and his purchase of a crib, baby clothes and
equipment, he has constructively complied with §230.
Appellant cites such cases as Lavell v. Adoption Institute, 185 Cal.App.2d 557, S.Cal.Rptr. 365, and
Estate of Abate, 166 Cal.App.2d 282, 333 P2d 200 in
support of this contention. But the facts of those
cases readily distinguish them from the case we now
consider . . . . It clearly appears in each of these
cases that there was an existing family unit into
which the illegitimate child was born. Here no family
unit has ever existed. It cannot properly be said
that the casual and unfortunate relationship here involved ever achieved the dignity of de facto family
status, such as was present in both Lavell and Abate.
Id., at 604 [Emphasis added]
In In re: Adoption of Pierce,15 Cal.App.3d 244, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 197 (Cal.App.1971), the appellant had publicly acknowledged
his paternity.

By stipulation and order of the court he had sup-

ported the child and has been allowed visitation with the child,
the latter against the mother's protestations.

On appeal, the

court found that the appellant had acknowledged the child but
that he had not received him "into his family" in accord with
the strict construction of that phrase of §230 as held required
in In Estate of DeLaveaga, 142 Cal.158, 75 Pac. 790.

In arriving

at this decision, the court discussed and found controlling the
meaning of the term "family" as used in §230, as previously considered in Darwin v. Granger, 174 Cal.App.2d 63, 72, 344 P.2d
35 3, 35 8:
If a man has no wife, he can legitimate his offspring
by a course of conduct which the conununity would consider a public acknowledgment that he was the father
of the child (Estate of Gird, 157 Cal. 534, 542-543,
108 P. 499, 137 Am.St.Rep. 131) but the existence of
such public acknowledgment by an unmarried man is a
question to be decided on the circumstances of each
case. Estate of Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 274-279, 223 P. 974.
Where a man has no wife, he can publicly acknowledge his
notwithstanding
fact
that
heInstitute
doesof Museum
not maintain
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a household into which the child is taken. See Blythe
v. Ayres, supra, 96 Cal. 532, 560, 592-593, 31 P.915;
In re Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 433-434, 21 P. 976, 22 P. 742.
1028, 6 L.R.A. 594.
If the man is unmarried the 'family' referred to in section 230 may consist only of
the father, the mother, and the child. Estate of Gird
supra, 157 Cal. 534, 540, 108 P. 499; Serway v.
'
Galentine, 75 Cal. App.2d 86, 90, 170 P.2d 32. Thus,
an unmarried man may legitimate his offspring byJ:lVIna
with the mother and child for a short period during ~
which he represented the mother as his wife and the
child as his own.
Serway v. Galentine, supra, 75 Cal.
App.2d 86, 90-91, 170 P.2d 32.
[Emphasis added)
Pierce, at 195.
Respondent has not received Corey into his family in u
meaningful way.

The child was not born into a family unit car·

posed of appellant and respondent.

To the contrary, the parh

have never lived together; never have they functioned as a sin:
social or economic unit.

No de facto family, comprising appel·

lant, respondent and Corey, has ever come into existence, larq'
as a consequence of respondent's willful acts.
For example, respondent refused to marry appellant in
order to provide a home for Corey, proposing, as alternative
solutions morally reprehensible to appellant, that Corey be
aborted or adopted by strangers.
1. 10)

(Trans. A, p. 57, 1. 19-p.51

And further, after Corey's birth, respondent did not

offer to share the house he was purchasing with appellant and
the child.

He chose to continue living alone leaving appellm

to fend for herself and her child as best she could.
p. 52, 1. 30-p. 53, 1.

3~

(Trans.

p. 59, 1. 16)
-18-
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C. Because respondent has not held out Corey's mother, the
appellant, to be his wife, the Court below erred in finding
respondent to have legitimated the child.
Sectio~

78-30-12 must be construed to require that the

biological father of an illegitimate child must, in order to
legitimate him, receive the child into his family
a legitimate child.
public policy.

as if he were

No other construction is compatible with

Note, 12 SO.CAL.L.REV. 97, 98 (1938).

mate child is received and associated with his mother.

A legitiHence,

consistent with the authorities cited herein, a child cannot be
received into a family as a legitimate child unless his mother
is held out to be his biological father's wife.
At no timehas respondent represented appellant to be his
wife and at no time has he represented Corey to be his legitimate
son.

Instead, by his every act, including bringing this action,

he has chosen a course of action calculated to emphasize the
illegitimacy of both relationships, disregarding the risk of
exposing both Corey and his mother to shame and ridicule.

D. Because appellant has not relinquished exclusive custody
and control of Corey, the Court below erred in finding respondent to have legitimated this child.
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As discussed in detail in Point VII, infra, under Utah
law, a mother has a superior right to custody and control of
her child born out of wedlock.

Where the mother retains custoc

and control of the child, she may effectively preclude legitimation by refusing to marry the father or by refusing to relinquish custody of the child to him.

Cheryl Lynn H. v. Superior

Court, 41 Cal. App.3d 273, 277-78, 115 Cal.Rptr. 849, 852,
(Cal.App. 1974); In re Adoption of Irby, 37 Cal.Rptr. 879, 881
(Cal. App. 1964).
In Irby, supra, the court interpreted the holding in a
previous case, Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal.2d 91, 265 P.2d
888, as judicial recognition that, under the provision of §230
of the California Civil Code,
... There are two situations in which the father of
an illegitimate child cannot legitimate the child
even though he is willing to do so. The first situation is where his wife, who is not the mother of the
child refuses to permit him to receive the child into
the family circle, and the second is where the natural
mother of the child refuses to give up custody of the
child thereby preventing him from receiving the child.
If either of these consents is lacking, he may not
legitimate the child.
Irby, supra, at 881.
California's Second District Court of Appeal found the
Irby reasoning, quoted above, and the holding therein, control·
ling, and held that the appellant natural father, who sought
reversal of a decree of adoption, had not legitimated his chl~
In re Adoption of Pierce, 15 Cal.App.3d 244, 93 Cal.Rptr. 171
(Cal.App. 1971).
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In Pierce, supra, the court reasoned that since the mother
of an illegitimate child has the right to "custody and control
of the child and therefore must (impliedly at least) consent to
the legitimation of the child by its natural father," her
stipulation to the natural father's visitation rights did
not amount to consent to legitimation.
Appellant has never relinquished her exclusive rights
to custody and control of Corey.

She has taken every step

possible, as demonstrated by her defense in the Court below,
to prevent erosion of these rights.
E. Because respondent had not made meaningful contribution to
Corey's support, the Court below erred in finding respondent
to have legitimated this child.
Although most of the cases cited herein do not require
proof of support as a primary element in determining legitmation, the payment of support remains a recognized index for
determining motivation of the biological father.
Until so ordered by Judge Winder, after trial in this
matter, respondent made no meaningful contribution to Corey's
support.

In 1974,he gave appellant some "spare money."

Re-

spondent testified to no support since 1974, stating that there
was no particular reason for this delinquency.

(Trans. A,

p. 37, 11.10-14)
Respondent paid nothing toward the support of appellant
and her unborn child, thus forcing appellant to continue living
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in a vermin-infested duplex without adequate heating and sanit
tion facilities, where she remained with Corey, as a matter of
financial necessity, until her marriage to Carmen R. Dennis.
(Trans. A, p. 58, 11. 15-29; Trans. B, p. 14, 1. 25-p. 15, 1.;
Respondent refused appellant's mother's plea for financial ast
tance.

(Trans. A, p. 58, 1. 30-p. 59, 1. 20)

Respondent did pi

appellant's hospital expenses, but only when requested to do s1
by appellant's mother.

(Trans. B, p. 18, 1. 5)

Upon hearing the evidence adduced during only the first
day of trial,Judge Winder stated, "I think he is a 'Johnny-cow
lately,' and I am going to make a heavy order of support. I u
tempted to make the order retroactive."

(Trans. A, p. 67, 1. [

POINT VI.
A FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAD
COMPLIED WITH §78-30-12 DID NOT
COMPEL AN AWARD OF VISITATION
RIGHTS TO RESPONDENT BY THE COURT
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court below was not in err
in finding the respondent to have complied with §78-30-12, uta·
Code Annotated, 1953, it does not follow that the Court was co:
pelled to grant visitation as a matter of right inherently f~
ing from such compliance.

§78-30-12 provides as follows:

The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly
acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such
with the consent of his wife, if he is married,
into his family, and such child is thereupon deemed
for all purposes legitimate from the time of its
birth. The foregoing provisions of this chapter
do not apply to such an adoption. [Emphasis added]
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Because he has admitted that he is Corey's biological
father, respondent cannot claim to have adopted this child.
"Adoption, properly speaking, refers only to persons who are
strangers in blood,"

Black's Law Dictionary,

(4th ed., 1968),

and must thus be distinguished from legitimation or an attempt
to legitimate.
§78-30-12 is a literal copy of the California statute,
which is found at §230 of the California Civil Code (1941).
Therefore, as there are no Utah cases directly on point regarding the construction of "adoption," "adopts," and the last sentence of this statute, it is appropriate to refer to California
case law pursuant to rules of judicial construction.

73 Am.Jur. 2d,

Statutes, §166.
The California Supreme Court has held that the final sentence of §230--"The foregoing provisions of this chapter do not
apply to such an adoption"--must be strictly construed, "neither
adding to nor subtracting from its words."
159 P.2d 643, 654.

In re Lund's Estate,

See also, Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82,

183 P. 552; 7 A.L.R. 313.
Therefore, it follows that the rights conferred on fathers
through adoption by §78-30-10 are not conferred through legitimation.
This is consistent with the purpose of the legitimation statutes,
which is to confer a status benefit upon the child, not to award
a benefit to his father.

Visitation should be awarded as a
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privilege, not a right, and only if such an award is consistent
with the child's best interest.
Further, as it is uniformly recognized by the authorith
that the best interests of the child must be afforded paramouru
consideration, and as Dr. Goates had recommended termination ol
respondent's visitation with the child, under any construction
of the statutes in question, Judge Winder would not have

ab~~

his discretion by denying the privilege of visitation to

re~oo

dent.

Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 417, 421-28; Harkins, supra; Goldstc

supra; Rozanski, supra; Sullivan, supra; Report, R 133.

POINT VII.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO
EXCLUSIVE CUSTODY AND CONTROL OVER
HER OUT-OF-WEDLOCK CHILD
Under Utah law, the living natural mother of an out-ofwedlock child possesses a right to his full custody and

contr~

This right is superior to the interests of all others, and is
exclusive of them.

See: State in the Interest of M, 25 Utah 2i

101, 105, 476 P.2d 1013, 1015-17 (1970); Jensen v. Earley,
63 Utah 604, 611-12, 228 Pac. 217, 219-20 (1924); R. Aaron,
"Proposals for Truce in the Holy War: Utah Adoption," 1970 UTAH
L.REV. 325, 331 (1970). The "custody and control" rights of th'
natural mother are superior to and exclusive of the conceded~
"secondary" rights of the biological father.

See: Annot., 45
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A.L.R.3d 216, 223-24; Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 417, 431-34.

This

rule is consistent with the law of other jurisdictions. 98 A.L.R.
2d 417

t

427-35 (1970),
In Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 2d

235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961), this Court expressed the general rule
regarding a biological father's rights:
The putative father of an illegitimate child occupies
no recognized paternal status at common law or under
our statutes. The law does not recognize him at all,
except that it will make him pay for the child's
maintenance if it can find out who he is. The only
father it recognizes as having any rights is the
father of a legitimate child.
12 Utah 2d 235, at
239, 364 P.2d 1029, at 1031-32 [Footnotes omitted]
This rule was modified somewhat in State in the Interest
of M, 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970), which held that the
acknowledged biological father of an illegitimate child has a
legal right to care, control, and custody of his child, but only
after the natural mother's superior rights have been lawfully
terminated.

For the purposes of the instant case, Thomas, supra,

remains in force, unmodified.
That the biological father has no "custody or control"
rights over the child in opposition to the rights of the mother
is expressly declared by the Utah legislature at §77-60-12, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
The father of such child shall not have the right to
its custody or control, if the mother is living and
wishes to retain such custody and control, until after
it shall have arrived at the age of ten years, unless,
upon petition by the District Court ... it shall be
made to appear that the mother is not a fit person
to have custody and control of said child . . . .
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While this Court has not had an opportunity to apply thi
statute to the issue of visitation presented here, courts in
other states have decided cases grounded on similar statutes.
For example, in DePhillips v. DePhillips, 219 N.E.2d 465 (Ill.
1966) , the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the statutory
denial to the father of "custody and control" rights over his
illegitimate child necessarily involves denial of any legal
visitation rights.

The Illinois Court held visitation to be

an element of "control" of the child, which statutorily vests
in the natural mother.

See also: Wallace v. Wallace, 210 N.E.

2d 4 (Ill. 1965); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 56 Misc.2d 711, 289
N.Y.S.2d 792, 794 (N.Y.City Ct. 1968).
Respondent has filed an Acknowledgement of Paternity as
required to establish "rights pertaining to paternity"

pursw~

to §78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
This statute was designed to accomodate the biological
father's right prior to adoption, as recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (191:
It concerns only his rights to notice and hearing after termini
tion of the natural mother's rights before adoption by persons
not biologically related to the child.

The limited "rights

pertaining to paternity" secured by this statute do not incl~
or create" custody and control" rights in conflict with those o:
appellant under §77-60-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Thus, the Court below erred in granting rights of visit
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to the respondent, in violation of appellant's statutorily mandated right to full custody and control of her minor child.

POINT VIII.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING
TO AFFORD APPELLANT THE SAME RIGHT
TO WITHHOLD CONSENT TO LEGITIMATION
AS HAS BEEN CONFERRED BY STATUTE ON
THE WIFE OF A BIOLOGICAL FATHER
Section 78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, requires that
the father of an illegitimate child, if married, must have the
consent of his wife in order to receive this child into his family.
If she withholds her consent, his child cannot be legitimated
pursuant to this statute.
There is no indication that this provision has ever been
challenged in the Utah courts, though on its face, and as applied,
hypothetic~lly,

it would inequitably and arbitrarily deny some

children born out of wedlock the status of legitimacy.
The presumption arises that when the Utah legislature chose
to incorporate §230 of the California Civil Code into Chapter 30
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as §78-30-12, it recognized
this issue of unequal treatment.

Therefore, it is submitted,

the legislature was moved to enact this particular provision by
what it found to be a more compelling principle of public policy -the sanctity of the marital bond and the privacy of the family
unit --the formal married state being favored by the law and all
other major public and quasi-public institutions.
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It follows that in enacting §78-30-12, the legislature
recognized that were the biological father's wife's consent
required as a matter of law, there would be instances in

n~

whi~

a child could be brought into her home against her will, to the
possible detriment of her relationship with her husband and to
that of other intra-family relationships, including that of hus·
band and wife to children born within their marriage, and that
of the legitimated child to these children.

Since the wife

~

a biological father is to be afforded total discretion to pnw
legitimation, even if to the certain detriment of the

child,~

why should this right not also be extended to the mother of

t~

child, especially when to do so would be in the best interests·
the child?
The California courts, in having held, under §230

oft~

California Civil Code, that mothers of children born out of weo·
lock are entitled to withhold consent to legitimation by

biol~

cal fathers, appear to have considered this equal protection
argument, however indirectly and cryptically.

See , In re Adop·

tion of Irby, In re Adoption of Pierce, and Darwin v. Granger,
supra.
The Court below erred in failing to recognize appellant'
right to withhold consent to legitimation by the respondent, tt
the detriment of Corey's best interests.
B, p. 32, 1. 20-p.

Report, R 133, Trans.

33, 1. 9.
-28-
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POINT IX.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING
TO PROTECT DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN FAMILY RELATIONS
AS IT BEARS UPON THE CHILD'S BEST
INTERESTS.
The courts have frequently emphasized the importance of the
family.

The United States Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390 (1932) held that "liberty" under the Fourteenth
Amendment denotes not only freedom from bodily restraL1t but
also the right" ... to marry, establish a home and bring up children...

The Court considered these rights to be "essential."

Id., at 399.

The rights to conceive and to raise one's children

were termed "basic civil rights of man," in Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S.535, 541 (1942).

Mr. Justice Burton, in May v. Anderson,

345 U.S.528 (1953) described a mother's rights to the care and
custody of her children as "rights far more precious ... than
property rights."

Id. at 533.

"It is cardinal with us that the

custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply or hinder," said the Court
in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.158, at 166 (1944).
This Court has been consistentin affirming these principles.
In State in the Interest of M., 25 U.2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (Utah
1970), the Court stated, "The right of a parent, under natural
law, to establish a home and bring up children is a fundamental
one and beyond the reach of any court.

This rule applies to
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illegitimate as well as legitimate children."

Id., 25 U.2d, at

107, 476 P.2d 103, at 1017.
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court, as WI
as other courts,

has

applied the "right of privacy" as it has

evolved under specific constitutional guarantees to the marital
and family relationships.

The roots of this development can be

traced through several decisions, such as Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S.510 (1925), in which the Court held unconstitutional an Oregon law forbidding parents from sending their d
dren to private schools.

The act, the Court said, "unreasonahl

interferes with the liberty of parents to direct the
and education of children under their control."

upbring~

Id., at 534-3)

Two decades later, the Court commented in Prince v. Massachuset·
supra, that the decisions in Pierce and Meyer, supra, "have re·
spected the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter."

Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman, 367[

497, 551-52 (1961), stated, "Certainly the safeguarding

oft~

home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property right
The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life.
And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental tha'.
it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of
more than one explicity granted constituional right . . . . "
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.479 (1965), the cour
expressly brought marital relationship under the protection of
the "right of privacy" in holding a Connecticut statute forbidd:
contraceptive
under
the Services
Four~
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Amendment.

In the words of Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring,

The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes
that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry
and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude
as the fundamental rights specifically protected.
Id., at 495.
Since Griswold, the United States Supreme Court has extended
constitutional protections to safeguard the privacy of the individual control of personal life, as in Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.52 (1976), and in parental control
of children and family relations, as in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205

(1972).

In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court, per Mr. Chief

Justice Burger, struck down the application of compulsory education laws to Amish children, commenting, "a state's interest in
universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally
free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental
rights and interests, such as ... the traditional interest of
parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children

Id., at 214.
In the case now before this Court, appellant has married,

resides with her husband, and is establishing a home and family
of which her "illegitimate" son is an integral part.

Corey,

her son, benefits from the development of a secure, autonomous
family unit under the control of the appellant and her husband.
Therefore, the enforced intrusion of the respondent into the
appellant's family should have been strictly scrutinized from
the standpoint of Corey's interests in the privacy and security
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of the appellant's marital and family relationships.
The Court below, in awarding judgment to the respondent,
erred in failing to protect these interests.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For the following reasons, the Court below was in error
in awarding rights of visitation to respondent and was in
error in finding the respondent to have legitimated the child,
absent the consent of appellant:
(1) Although the child's best interests must be consider·
ed paramount, the Court awarded visitation rights to respondent absent any showing by respondent that visitation would
benefit the child and in the face of Dr. Goates' recommendations against visitation, which were neither challenged nor
rebutted by respondent;
(2) Respondent was not and is not entitled to rights
equal to those of a divorced father, for unlike the latter,
he has never exercised actual or legal custody over the child,
and has thus never assumed any significant responsibility for
his daily supervision, education, protection, or care;
(3) The child has not been legitimated by respondent fm
the reasons that appellant has not relinquished custody and
control of her child and has not consented to legitimation by
respondent, respondent has not received the child into his

-32-
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family, has not held out appellant to be his wife, and has
made no significant contribution to the child's support.
Sporadic visitation and mere "declaration of paternity" do
not meet the requirements for legitimation pursuant to §7830-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953;
(4) Assuming, arguendo, that respondent had legitimated
the child, such a finding did not dictate an award of visitation to respondent in the absence of evidence that such visitation would be in the child's best interests;
(5) The Court below erred in failing to recognize appellant's right to exclusive custody and control over the child;
(6) The Court below erred in failing to recognize appellant's right to withhold consent to legitimation by respondent;
(7) The Court below erred in failing to protect appellant's right to privacy in family relations as it bears upon
the child's best interests.

CONCLUSION
The controlling concern, inextricably a part of each
issue discussed in the preceding pages, is the best interests
of the child, not alleged rights of paternity.

The evidence

adduced at trial established that visitation was not in the
best interests of the child, and consistent therewith, no
reference to the child's best interests, present or future,
is made in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decree byentered
in Law
the
Court
below.
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Therefore, even if considered solely on this ground,
the award of visitation rights to respondent was in error.
It is also submitted that the Court below was in error
in finding respondent to have legitimated the child.

This

conclusion is also predicated on respondent's failure to act
in the child's best interests, including his failure to synthesize, at any time since the birth of the child, a normal
family relationship incorporating himself, the child, and
appellant.

Appellant respectfully submits that she is entitled to '
a reversal of the lower Court's decision on the ground that
legitimation of the child and visitation by respondent with
the child are not in the child's best interests.

In the alter-

native, should this Court determine that the Court below was
not in error in finding respondent to have legitimated the
child, appellant submits that reversal in part, finding the
respondent not to be entitled to visitation with the child,
would be appropriate and proper.
DATED

May 5, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief on
Appeal were mailed to E. H. Fankhauser, attorney for respondent,
430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, United States
mail, postage prepaid, on May 5, 1978.
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